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Farmers’ exit decisions and early retirement programs in Finland 
 
 
Abstract: This paper estimates farmer decisions between three discrete occupational choices: 
exit and close down the farming operation (1), exit and transfer the farm to a new entrant (2), or 
continue farming and retain the option to exit later on (3). The farmer optimisation problem is 
formulated as a recursive optimal stopping problem. The unknown parameters are first estimated 
by a switching-type, reduced form Probit models and, then by the Simulated maximum 
likelihood (SML) method, controlling for serial correlation in the errors. Serial correlation in the 
errors is controlled for by the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulation technique. The 
results suggest that the timing and the type of farmer exit decisions respond elastically to farmer 
characteristics, farm characteristics, and economic environment. Early retirement programs and 
the level of farmer retirement benefits are predicted to play a key role in steering structural 
development and enhancing family farms in the Nordic agricultural sectors.  
 




1.  Introduction 
 
The agricultural sector is undergoing fast structural development in most European countries. 
Particularly in Finland, the need for structural change has been obvious since Finland’s entry into 
the EU. At the time of EU entry, Finnish agriculture was characterised by high production costs 
and by an average farm size that was too small to efficiently utilise modern technologies so as to 
be competitive in the European Common Market. To get a more competitive agricultural sector, 
a large number of public policy programs have been designed and applied to Finnish agriculture. 
Among the policy programs, the temporarily applied and subsidised short-term early retirement 
programs have played an important role. As a result, the average farm size has been increasing 
and the number of farms has decreased at an annual rate of five per cent. The number of farms in 
1995 was 95,562 and in 2000 it had decreased to 77,896. 
The farmers’ early retirement programs have two main goals. First, they aim at enhancing 
the  transfer of farms from ageing farmers to new entrants, e.g. from parents to their children. 
This is an important goal to contribute preserving the agricultural structure based on family 
farms also in the future and to maintaining sufficiently large population in rural areas. The 
second goal of the early retirement programs is to improve competitiveness in the agricultural 
sector by transferring resources, such as land and production rights, from exiting farmers to the 
farmers who will continue in farming and are motivated to get more competitive through 
expansion of their farm operations. Thus, the timing and the type of occupational choices among 
elderly farmers play a crucial role in determining the characteristics of the structural change in 
agriculture. By elderly farmers, we mean farmers that are sufficiently old to have the option to 
voluntarily exit from farming using a certain pension benefit scheme. Exit from farming implies 
either closing down the farm operation or transferring the farm to a new entrant. When the farm 
operation is ceased, the farm’s agricultural resources, such as land and production rights, are sold 
or leased to neighbouring farmers. In previous retirement programs, the farmer also had an  
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option to leave his/her land idle or plant trees on it but these options are not preferred in more 
recent programs.    
  Important research and policy questions that emerge then are: What are the factors that 
determine the timing and the type of exit from farming among elderly farmers, and how do 
public policies, such as early retirement programs foster these choices. These questions are 
particularly relevant at present because the farming population is ageing. The large so called 
“baby-boom generation”, born in the late 40’s and in the early 50’s, is by now approaching an 
age in which it has the option to retire. The early retirement programs for farmers are also 
frequently under intensive political debate, because the current short term programs are funded 
by society and they are costly. Uncertainty over the continuation of the early retirement 
programs is also a problem for farmers. Uncertainty may significantly increase costs for a young 
farmer to purchase an insurance scheme that will provide a secure and flexible retirement plan. 
An indication of this is that the demand for market based early retirement insurance has been 
increasing rapidly during the last few years. About 30 per cent of farmers already operate in two 
insurance markets. They buy the obligatory retirement plan in the farmer retirement program and 
complement it by the market based early retirement plan. Thus, new information is needed in 
designing programs that have the desired long term effects on farmer exit behaviour, funding of 
retirement plans, and structural development in agriculture and rural areas. 
This paper estimates factors determining farmer decisions between three discrete 
occupational choices: exit and closing down the farm (1), exit and transfer of the farm to a new 
entrant (2), or continuing farming and retaining the option to exit later (3). This optimal stopping 
problem has a  recursive structure and, over the continuation period (i.e. when farmer continues 
to farm), it satisfies a certain Bellman’s equation. The unknown parameters are estimated by 
three specifications of a switching-type, reduced form Probit model. The first specification is the 
standard equation-by-equation Probit model that assumes independently distributed errors with 
no serial correlation in both equations. The second specification allows the errors to be correlated 
between equations and is estimated by the multinomial Probit model. The third specification 
controls for first order serial correlation in the errors by using Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane 
(GHK) -simulation technique (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989; Keane, 1993). In the 
third specification, the unknown parameters are estimated by the Simulated Maximum 
Likelihood (SML) method.  
The results provide insights in how the agricultural market and policy environment, 
short-term early retirement programs and farmer characteristics affect the timing and the type of 
exit decisions among elderly farmers. These results provide valuable information for designing 
policies that aim at improving structural development in the agricultural sector.  
 
2.   The ModelThe ModelThe Model 
In the general form, farmer decisions are denoted by a binary indicator dk for k=1,…,3 such 
that dk=1 if the occupation k with current period indirect utility Uk is chosen and dk=0 
otherwise. Value k=1 refers to exit and closing down the farm operation; value k=2 refers to 
the exit and transferring the farm to a new entrant, while value k=3 refers to the continuation 
in farming while retaining the option to exit later on. Because the choices are mutually 
exclusive, the identity d1+d2+d3=1 holds between the indicators.  
  Current period indirect utilities from the two types of retirements (U1 and U2) consist 
of the utility from pension benefits, on-farm housing benefits, leisure etc. Utility is allowed to  
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differ between the two exit types for two reasons. First, closing down the farming operation 
may, in practice, make a significant contribution to the utility of the retiring farmer compared 
to the utility from transferring the farm to a new entrant. Second these two exit types have 
diverse contributions to structural development in agriculture and they can be separated to 
have different terms in the early retirement programs. Current indirect utility from farming 
and farm income (U3 ) is a function of current prices, subsidies, fixed inputs, farm 
characteristics, farmer characteristics, and other return shifters. 
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where β>0 is the discount factor, E(⋅) is the mathematical expectations operator, and Z(t) is the 
predetermined state space at time t.  The state space consists of all factors, known to the firm 
operator which affect the current period utility (e.g. prices, subsidy rates, the level of pension). 
Equation (1) is maximised choosing the optimal sequence of control variables (dk(t)) over the 
finite horizon of t=0,..,T.  
The optimal value function can be rewritten as (Keane and Wolpin, 1994): 
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where Vk(Z(t),t) is the occupation k specific value function that satisfies the Bellman equation of 
the form (Bellman, 1957): 
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subject to a certain set of transition equations for the current state Z(t). Note that our notation 
generalises for the case in which the optimal value function, conditional on exit, is the standard 
discounted present value, as in Lumsdaine et al. (1992)   
Augmenting Vkt by an error term vkt , occupation k is chosen and dk(t)=1 if  
 
    k j v V v V jt jt kt kt ≠ ∀ + > + ,       (4) 
 
which implies 
    k j V V v v kt jt jt kt ≠ ∀ − > − ,       ( 5 )  
 
Thus, the boundaries for choices are determined by the differences between the occupation 
specific value functions and by the differences of the corresponding errors.  
The structural form estimation of (2), (3) and (5) would require a solution for the occupation 
specific value functions by, for example, numerically iterating on the Bellman equation (3) 
conditional on some functional specification for the one period indirect utility Uk(β) and trial 
                                                 
1 Only the continuation region is considered because the decision to exit is at least partially irreversible.   
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values for the parameters β. The parameter values could then be updated estimating the 
behavioural equations given by (5) (e.g. Rust 1987). The structural form estimation requires 
numerical simulation of the expected values for the next period’s optimal value functions, i.e. for 
expected maximum for the future revenue streams that are stochastic and dependent on the 
occupational choices (e.g. Keane and Wolpin 1994). 
A computationally less demanding approach is to normalise the boundaries of the error 
distributions by the value of one occupation and approximate only the differences of the 
occupation specific value functions by a reduced form representation (e.g. Dorfman, 1996). 
Because the choices are based on the differences of the occupation specific indirect utility 
streams (not on the level of each utility stream) the reduced form is empirically tractable. 
Approximation errors between the structural optimal stopping model and the reduced form 
models are found negligible (Provencher, 1997). A reduced form specification has also been the 
standard in the earlier studies on discrete choices (e.g. Green et al., 1996). Since the current 
period returns of farming are unobserved in the data available in this study, the structural form 
estimation in a way similar to, e.g. Pietola and Oude Lansink (2001) is not feasible.  
In our application, the differences in the value functions are approximated so that at time t, 
firm i chooses  1 ) ( = t d
i
k  if 
 












t kj v v − = , ε ,  X∈Z is a vector of instruments, and β is a vector of parameters. Similarly, 
0 ) ( = t d
i
k  is chosen if kj t t kj X β ε < ,  at least for one j≠k. 
The reduced form parameters in β  are first estimated by the equation-by-equation Probit 
and multinomial Probit models. In these estimations, serial correlation of the period-by-period 
choices are not controlled for. Serial correlation can, nevertheless, be significant since farmer 
choices are expected to persist over time. Serial correlation may also arise if the next period 
choices are affected by past shocks (Pakes, 1986). Following Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), this 
paper controls for serial correlation by simulating the sequence of interrelated choice 
probabilities using the GHK-simulation technique. The parameters are then estimated by 
Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989; Keane, 
1993).  
For given k and j, the two boundaries (inequalities) are stacked in (Keane, 1993) 
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Dropping the kj subscripts, the sequence of errors  }' ,..., , { 2 1
i
T
i i i ε ε ε ε =  can be further stacked over 
time  t=1,2…,T, as 
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triangular matrix of the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix Σ so that 
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i i E AA ε ε = = Σ . Using these definitions, (7) can be written in its general form as (Keane, 
1993): 
 


















The GHK simulation technique is to first sequentially draw the errors 
i
t
i i η η η ,... , 2 1  from a 
truncated univariate normal distribution so that they are consistent with the observed choices, 
i.e., the inequality (8) given above holds for each draw. The simulation is started at time t=1 by 
drawing 
i
1 η  (with other  s
i' η  being zero) for each farm i, so that the draw is consistent with the 
observed choice, i.e. the draw satisfies the inequality  
 
β η
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If we observe  1 1 =
i d  the truncation point consistent with the observed choice is   β η
i i X1 1 − > . 
Alternatively, if  0 1 =
i d  the consistent truncation point is   β η
i i X1 1 > −  
 Next, the truncation point is updated by substituting the first draw, say 
i
1 ˆ η , for 
i
1 η  in (8). The 
second error 
i
2 η is drawn using the updated truncation point 
   1 , 1 1 1 , 1 2 2 2 2 2 / )] ˆ )( 1 2 ( ) 2 1 [( ) 1 2 ( A A d X d d
i i i i i i η β η − − − > −  
and substituting this new draw
i
2 ˆ η , for 
i
2 η  in (8). This procedure is continued until t=T. The 
sequence of these T draws is repeated S times for each firm i.  
  The second step is to form the corresponding unbiased simulators for the transition 
probabilities. Because the computation of these transition probabilities follows a well-established 
procedure and the derivation of these transition probabilities is lengthy, it is omitted here. A 
detailed description and discussion on computing the transition probabilities is found in Keane 
(1993, pp. 550-554).  
  Our application has three choice alternatives. Because the choices are mutually exclusive, 
two binary indicators are sufficient in identifying them. These two binary indicators are defined 
as follows. 
     d1(t) = 1, if farmer exits and closes down the farm operation   
   0, otherwise 
d2(t)= 1, if farmer exits and transfers the farm to a new entrant 
   0, otherwise 
 
The third choice of continuing in farming is observed if  d1(t)+d2(t)=0.  
The log likelihood function, 
i
t l , for a single observation has the form  
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where P(⋅) are the simulated probabilities, conditional on choices made before time t (Jt-1 ), a set 
of exogenous instruments (Xt), and trial parameters (β ˆ ). The GHK simulator was based on 20 
draws for the error sequence of each firm (i.e., S=20). This number of draws has been found to 
result only in a negligible simulation bias even when the simulated choice probabilities are small 
(Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993). 
  The lower-triangular matrices, consisting of the elements that are used in multiplying the 
simulated error sequences (η’s) in the choice equations (for d1(t) and d2(t)), are denoted by A1  
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and A2. In order to decrease the parameter space and identify the parameters in the model, a set 
of restrictions was imposed on the elements of A1 and A2. All diagonal elements in both A’s was 
set equal to one implying that Σ1[i,i]= Σ2 [j,j]=1 for all i and j . This restriction corresponds to 
the standard identification of Probit model so that the variance of the error term is set to one. The 
elements that are immediately below the diagonal are allowed to be non-zero and equal to each 
other within A’s (i.e. they are allowed to differ between A’s). These parameters control for time 
constant serial correlation in the errors. For identification reasons, all other off-diagonal elements 
are imposed at zeros. 
 
3.  Data  
The data on farmer exit decisions, family and farm characteristics, and saved retirement benefits 
are from the farmers’ pension company MELA. The sample is a stratified random draw of 963 
farmers among all farmers in the population who were born during the period of 1929-1943 and 
were active farmers in 1993. The sample is stratified by farmer age such that at each age the 
share of observations out from the total sample is equal to the corresponding share in the 
population. Therefore, the sample is a good representation of all farmers belonging to the 
sampled age group. The study period starts in year 1993 and ends in year 1998. The oldest 
farmer in the sample was aged 64 years old in 1993 and the youngest was 55 years old in 1998. 
The sample has been determined so that each farmer in the sample has had an option to retire or 
continue farming while retaining the option to retire later on.
2  Over the study period farmers 
have become eligible for the early retirement programs at the age of 55 years, and at the age of 
65 he/she will loose the option to delay collecting of retirement benefits. 
  Farmers who have been obliged to exit farming exogenously have been included in the 
sample over the continuation period only. All exogenous exits have been dropped in the sample. 
These cases include, for example, unpredictable serious accidents, health problems, and deaths. 
Therefore, the sample used in estimation is a random sample among farmers who have had the 
freedom to endogenously choose optimal timing and the type of exit from farming. Because the 
exit decisions are irreversible, all farmers are dropped in the sample after exit. 
  The sample includes 456 farms that were operated by a couple. On these farms, the older 
person of the couple is defined as the farmer and the younger is defined as the spouse, since the 
age of the older person of a couple determines their eligibility for the early retirement benefits.  
Annual values for price indices are obtained from the Yearbook of Farm Statistics (1998) 
and, for a given year, they are the same for all farms in the sample. The output price index 
represents all agricultural output. Subsidy rates are the subsidies paid per hectare of feed barley 
and they are obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture. The subsidy rates differ by year and farm 
location.
3 The sample period is characterised by large variation of farm gate prices and subsidy 
rates per hectare of arable land. Output prices decreased and the subsidy rates increased, 
particularly at the beginning of 1995 when Finland joined the European Union (EU). Descriptive 
statistics of the data are in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the data (units of measurement in parentheses, the total number 
of farms in the sample is 963).  
                                                 
2 Note: A farmer age is exogenously determined and, thus, using age as the outlier does not bias estimates.   
3 Feed barley was chosen as the reference crop because it is one of the most commonly grown crops in Finland.  










Farmer age (years)  
Share of farms located in the North (%) 
a 
Land area (hectares) 
Forest area  (hectares) 
Output price index (1993=1) 
Subsidy rate (FIM 1,000 per hectare of feed barley) 
Pension (FIM 1,000 per month) 




















a  The dummy variable “North” includes Northern and Central agricultural areas in Finland. Using the codes of 
the subsidy areas, as they are adapted in the agricultural administration, “North” includes all areas from area C1 
to the North. 
 
4. Results  
Parameter estimates  
Most parameter estimates differ significantly from zero in both choice equations and in all of the 
three model specifications. The parameter estimates have the same signs with an exception of the 
output price parameter. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the parameters differ between the 
specifications. The mean log likelihood value is in the GHK simulated Probit model –0.165 and 
in the standard multinomial Probit model –0.177, suggesting that the serial correlation in the 
errors is significant. Therefore, the results are interpreted below in the GHK specification. These 
results are, however, robust to model specification so that most of the qualitative results remain 
unchanged even if the GHK specification is replaced by the multinomial Probit.  
  Probability of exit through the early retirement programs is decreasing with farmer age. 
Thus, the highest probability for voluntary exit is immediately when a farmer receives the option 
to exit. Transferring the farm to a new entrant is decreasing faster with farmer age than closing 
down the farming operation. This result suggests that if the minimum age requirement of being 
eligible for the pension benefits is increased, the number of young farmers entering farming is 
predicted to decrease. Thus, the age limit increase will slow down the structural development in 
the short run but will hasten it in the long run, because a smaller number of new farmers enter the 
sector and a larger number of farms will be eventually closed down.  
  The dummy variable “North” identifying the Northern and Central areas indicates that 
farmers retire earlier in the North than in the South. Also, a larger share of exiting farmers will 
transfer the farm to a new entrant in the North than in the South. A possible reason for this result 
is that the terms of Finland’s entry to the EU gave better and more steady income subsidy 
programs for the farms located in Northern areas than for the farms located in Southern areas. 
Also the opportunity cost of entering farming is higher in the South than in the North, since 
demand for labour is stronger and earning possibilities in off-farm occupations are better in the 
South than in the North.  
  Increasing land area increases the likelihood of postponing the decision to exit and close 
down the farm, but it will schedule transferring the farm to a new entrant earlier. The result also 
supports the view that large farms are more likely transferred to new entrants than small farms.  
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Large forest areas will postpone all exit decisions but the effect of one additional hectare of  
forest is smaller than the effect of one additional hectare of arable land.  
  Decreasing output price is predicted to trigger farmers to exit and close down the farming 
operation, although the effect is statistically insignificant. The likelihood to transfer the farm to a 
new entrant is, on the other hand, significantly increasing with output prices. Thus, more 
transfers occur when the agricultural output market is favourable. The result suggests that the 
decreased producer prices, resulting from Finland’s EU entry in 1995, have significantly 
decreased the number of new entrants in agriculture. Changes in income subsidy rates do not 
reschedule exit decisions and closing down the farm operation significantly. The result supports 
the view that a large number of elderly farmers have not fully adjusted to the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) with lower output prices and higher direct income subsidies. 
Increased subsidies are, nevertheless, expected to increase the number of farms transferred to 
new entrants. This result suggests that young entrants are more neutral between income from 
subsidies vis à vis the market than elderly farmers.  
  The level of saved pension has a significant and similar effect on both types of exit 
decisions. Higher retirement benefits trigger farmers into exiting early. The result is consistent 
with farmers’ low income levels so that the marginal utility of money is large and the level of 
pension is important. The level of pension benefits is important also when the farm is transferred 
to a new entrant (e.g. own child), because most Finnish farms are too small for sustaining two 
families.   
  The number of exits closing down the farm is significantly increased at the edge of 
expiration of the early retirement program. The result suggests that farmers have a tendency to 
delay decisions to exit and close down the farm until the early retirement program is expiring and 
uncertainty over the terms of the subsequent retirement programs is increased. The financial 
stress in funding the new programs usually results in intense political debate, which in practice is 
a threat of decreasing the retirement benefits. 
  When the farm is transferred to a new entrant, such as own child, the exit is not 
postponed until the last year but the pension benefits are collected earlier.   
  If a farmer has a spouse, he or she is predicted to  retire earlier than farmers living on 
their own. This result suggests that couples more easily shift away from agricultural activities 
than single persons. However, the lower probability of exit and transfer for single persons may 
also be explained by the fact that single persons less frequently have a successor available.   
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Table 2. Parameter estimates of the three model specifications (standard errors in parentheses). 
 
Exit and closure  
 



























Land area  
 
 
Forest area  
 
 










































































































  (0.7704) 
 
-0.0563 
























































































  AR(1)  
 














































Elasticity estimates  
Elasticity estimates suggest that the likelihood of voluntary exit through the early retirement 
programs decreases elastically with farmer’s age (Table 3). Farmers in Northern and Central 
areas of the country have a 38% higher probability to close down the farm and a 55% higher 
probability to transfer the farm to new entrant, using the early retirement programs, than farmers 
in Southern areas. The farm land area has quite an elastic, though opposite effect on the timing of 
exit with the closure and exit with the transfer. The effect of forest area on closing down the farm 
is elastic and its effect is negligible on the timing of transferring the farm to a new entrant. 
 
Table 3. Elasticity estimates of the response probabilities. 
a 
Per cent change in the response probability   
Model variable (description of  
the change in the parentheses) 
Exit and closure   Exit and transfer   
 
Farmer age  (+ 1 year) 
North  (from South to North) 
Land area  (+1%) 
Forest area  (+1%) 
Output price  (+1%) 
Subsidy rate  (+1%) 
Pension  (+1%) 
Last year (from previous year to the last year) 


































a  Changes in response probabilities are evaluated at the sample averages for continuous model 
variables. The dummy variables have values: “North”=0; “Last year” =0, and “spouse”=1. 
That is, the “base farm” is located in South, pension program is not about to expire, and the 
farmer has a spouse.  
*   An asterisk denotes significance at 5% level. 
 
  The probability of transferring the farm to a new entrant increases very elastically with 
output prices. Similarly, the retirement benefits have very elastic and positive effects on the 
response probabilities. Uncertainty caused by the expiration of the temporary retirement 
programs double the probability of closing down the farm in order to collect the retirement 
benefits.  Furthermore, the elasticity estimates suggest that single farmers are about 70 % less 
likely to exit and use the early retirement benefits than couples.   
 
Simulation  
The results of the GHK model are simulated with respect to farmer age and with respect to the 
price and subsidy changes caused by Finland’s EU entry. The effects of the EU entry are 
important to obtain a better understanding of how the price and subsidy changes experienced at  
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the beginning of 1995 are predicted to affect long term structural development in the agricultural 
sector. 
4  
Simulation with respect to farmer age has a particular goal to seeking an answer for the 
policy change which increases the minimum age of being accessible for the early retirement 
benefits from the current 55 years to 58 years. This policy change is expected to have two 
effects. First, it will postpone exit decisions for farmers between ages 55 and 58 since at that age 
they no longer would have the option to exit, i.e., access to the pension benefits. Second, the 
parameter estimates suggest that the postponed exit decisions will also decrease the share of 
farms transferred to new entrants among all exit cases.   
  The probability of transferring the farm to a new entrant will decrease faster with farmer 
age than the probability of closing down the farm operation (Figure 1). Three fourths (75%) of 
farmers who voluntarily exit at the age of 55 years are predicted to transfer their farm to a new 
entrant and a fourth of them (25%) will close down the farm. At the age of 65, the probability of 
transferring the farm to a new entrant is decreased by 9 per cent units. Two thirds (66%) of 
farmers exiting at the age of 65 will transfer the farm to a new entrant and the remaining third 
will close down the farm.  
  A reform, which increases the minimum age requirement from 55 years to 58 years, will 
delay the exit decisions as highlighted in Figure 2. The reform will decrease the number of farms 
transferred to new entrants more, both in relative and absolute terms, than the number of  farms 
closed down. The number of farms transferred to new entrants through the early retirement 
program is predicted to decrease by 40 per cent, whereas the number of closures will be 
decreased by 30 per cent. If, for example, 1,000 farmers become 55 years of age, 220 of them are 
predicted to transfer the farm to new entrants and 84 of them are predicted to close down the 
farm through the current early retirement program. Under the reformed program the 
corresponding numbers are predicted at 130 and 55.  
                                                 
4 Similar to the elasticity estimates given above, the simulations are executed around the sample means of 
continuous model variables (other than the simulated variables). The simulated farm is located in the South (i.e., 
dummy variable North =0), farmer has a spouse (Spouse=1), and the pension program is not expiring (Last 
year=0).    
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Figure 1. Probability of voluntary exit through early retirement programs as a function of farmer 
age.    
Figure 2. The effects of increasing the minimum age requirement from 55 to 58 years on the 
cumulative exit rates. Bold continuous and dotted lines: before the reform; thin lines: after the 
reform.  
 
Price and subsidy changes between 1994 and 1998, which were caused primarily by Finland’s 
entry into the EU, have decreased the probability of transferring the farm to a new entrant by two 




























exit and close 
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results suggest that the share of farms transferred to new entrants among voluntarily exiting 
farmers was, at 1994 prices, 71% and, at 1998 prices, it had decreased to 53%. European agenda 
2000 reform, which decreases producer prices and increases direct income subsidies, is predicted 
to further delay farmer exit decisions closer to the age of 65 years and decrease the share of 
farms transferred to new entrants among the exiting farmers.  
Figure 3. Probability of voluntary exit through the early retirement plans at 1994 and 1998 prices 
and subsidy rates. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper estimates the timing and the type of exit decisions among farmers who have the 
option to exit from farming or continue farming while retaining the option to exit later. The 
results suggest that the timing and the type of farmer exit decisions respond elastically to farmer 
and farm characteristics and economic environment, such as farmer age, farm land area, prices 
and retirement benefits. 
  Policy reforms that alter farmer access to early retirement benefits are predicted to have  
important consequences for structural development in agriculture. Increasing the minimum age 
for a farmer being eligible for the early retirement plan, for example, will first slow down 
structural development since farmers cannot exit as early as before. Nevertheless, as the exit 
decision is delayed and the age of farmer is increased, the probability to transfer the farm for new 
entrant will decrease. Less young farmers will enter farming and the structural development will 
be accelerated in the long run. This result may be an indication that if a farmer has a potential 
entrant, e.g. his own child,  he should have incentives to transfer the farm for the new entrant 
before the potential entrant has moved away from the farm and has found a steady utility in other 
occupations with higher income, more leisure etc. 
  Farmer decision to exit also responds very elastically to agricultural prices and to the 
level of farmers’ retirement benefits. The decreased output prices, e.g. caused for the most part 























agriculture. If the forthcoming reforms of the CAP further decrease output prices, it will be a 
challenge for a high cost country with low population density, such as Finland, to maintain an 
adequate number of young farmers entering farming and staying in rural areas. Besides output 
prices, the early retirement programs and the level of farmer retirement benefits play a key role 
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